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Compatibilists and incompatibilists agree that a condition of control over one’s choices 
and actions has to be satisfied if one is to be morally responsible for these choices and 
actions. An agent’s control over her choices and actions should include at least two 
aspects: some degree of rationality and some degree of autonomy or self-determination. 
The rationale for including the first aspect is that purely random, arbitrary choices or 
actions do not seem to be sufficiently in the agent’s hands (under her control) for her to 
be justifiably judged as blame- or praiseworthy on account of them. This is why they 
should meet at least some minimal rationality requirements. Satisfaction of the second 
aspect, in turn, is designed to ensure that the agent is actually the source or author of the 
choice or action for which she is judged as blame- or praiseworthy. Actions or choices 
caused by external forces are not justifiably attributed to an agent. This much can be 
considered as common ground. Any acceptable theory of moral responsibility should 
include some requirement of rational control and some requirement of autonomy or self-
rule. Discrepancies, however, start shortly after these minimal points of agreement. 
Typically, incompatibilists tend to consider compatibilist accounts of the self-
determination aspect as not deep enough to ground moral responsibility, while 
compatibilists tend to view incompatibilist theories, with their insistence on 
indeterminism as necessary for moral responsibility, as unable to offer a satisfactory 
account of the rationality aspect. 
 
For early compatibilists, in rough terms, an agent exercises control over her actions on 
the basis of her desires: an agent controls her actions provided that she does what she 
wants to do. This view of control does include the two aspects we have pointed to: on the 
one hand, a choice or action caused by desire has a minimal rational explanation; on the 
other hand, if an agent’s self – as Hume suggested – is partly constituted by her own 
desires, determination by her own desires is self-determination. However, control, so 
conceived, is arguably too superficial as a basis of moral responsibility attributions.1 It 
has been replaced by more sophisticated compatibilist accounts, which incorporate deeper 
levels of control. The desire on which an agent acts has to be backed by a reflective, 
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second-order volition (Frankfurt), or by the agent’s values (Watson), and the agent’s self 
is conceived as centrally constituted by her second-order volitions or by her values, rather 
than by her ordinary, first-order desires. On other perspectives, the agent has to be able 
to form objectively correct values and to act on them (Wolf), or to act on a practical 
reasoning ‘mechanism’ that is her own and appropriately responsive to reasons (Fischer 
and Ravizza). 
 
Incompatibilists may readily acknowledge a progress in compatibilist accounts of control, 
from the early, simple proposals of Hobbes or Hume to the sophisticated views of 
Frankfurt, Watson, Wolf or Fischer. But, in their opinion, owing to the project of giving 
an account of moral responsibility compatible with determinism, even sophisticated 
views are bound to offer a weak, superficial picture of control, which cannot provide an 
appropriate ground for moral responsibility. Incompatibilists may agree that rational and 
volitional control over one’s actions, in some of the ways proposed by compatibilists, 
may be necessary for moral responsibility, but they will insist that an additional feature 
is required in order to have something close to a sufficient condition, namely ultimacy. 
In order for an agent to be morally responsible for her actions, she has to be their true, 
ultimate origin by having ultimate control over them. An agent enjoys rational and 
volitional control over her actions by choosing to perform them in the light of such factors 
as her first- and second-order desires, values and even traits of character constitutive of 
her self. This means that these factors explain, as either necessary or sufficient conditions, 
why she acted as she did. So, an agent’s control has to extend to these explanatory factors 
in order for her to effectively control the choices and actions that such factors help to 
explain and to be truly praise- or blameworthy for such choices and actions. According 
to the incompatibilist’s intuition, an agent’s rational and volitional control over her 
actions is too slender a basis for moral responsibility; she also has to control the self that 
these actions arise from. An agent is truly morally responsible for the way she acts only 
if she is truly responsible for the way she is. Only then can the agent be said to be the 
true, ultimate source or origin of her actions and objectively deserve praise or blame for 
them. 
 
This deep, ultimate control condition for moral responsibility is what Robert Kane has 
called ‘ultimate responsibility’ and Galen Strawson ‘true self-determination’. If this 
actually is a condition for moral responsibility, the sceptical suspicion easily arises that 
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moral responsibility is not possible. Ultimate control involves two aspects, namely 
ultimacy of source and rational cum volitional control. And it would seem that this 
condition is incompatible with either determinism or indeterminism. Determinism may 
allow for rational cum volitional control, but not for ultimacy of source, for, with the 
possible exception of a first, uncaused cause, there are no ultimate sources or origins in a 
deterministic world. Indeterminism, in turn, allows for events, such as choices, that, being 
undetermined, can play the role of fresh, ultimate origins or causes, but now it seems that 
these ultimate causes cannot be under the agent’s rational cum volitional control. If these 
events, say choices, are explained by previously existent reasons, they can be rational but 
hardly ultimate causes; and if they are not so explained, they can be ultimate but not 
rationally controlled causes. 
 
In fact, acceptance of deep, ultimate control as a requirement for moral responsibility has 
led some thinkers, such as Galen Strawson and Derk Pereboom (2001), to take a sceptical 
stance towards moral responsibility. Strawson’s well-known sceptical argument goes 
roughly as follows. Rational actions are paradigmatic candidates to the status of free and 
responsible actions, if such there are. Now the way we act when we act rationally, that is, 
for reasons, depends on our mental constitution, or character. So, unless we are truly 
responsible for our mental constitution, we will not be truly responsible for our rational 
actions. But in order to be truly responsible for our mental constitution, we have to have 
chosen that mental constitution in a rational way, that is, in the light of certain principles 
of choice or reasons. These reasons or principles explain the choice of our mental 
constitution. So we cannot be truly responsible for this choice, and so for our chosen 
mental constitution, unless we are responsible for having such principles to begin with; 
and this in turn requires that we have chosen them rationally, that is, in the light of a 
further set of principles of choice or reasons, and so on. According to Strawson, then, true 
responsibility or true self-determination (ultimate control, in our terms) ‘is logically 
impossible because it requires the actual completion of an infinite regress of choices of 
principles of choice’ (Strawson 1986: 29). It seems, then, that no choice can be both an 
ultimate and a rational source of one’s actions. In the end, we are bound to choose and 
act on the basis of factors that we cannot have rationally chosen and for which we cannot 
be truly responsible. Ultimate control (true self-determination, in Strawson’s terms) 
would seem to involve a self-defeating demand for self-creation. As Randolph Clarke has 
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put the point, according to Strawson ‘rational free action would be possible only for an 
agent who was causa sui’ (Clarke 1997: 37). 
 
If something like ultimate control is in fact both necessary for moral responsibility and 
impossible to attain, then moral responsibility is not possible. And this is precisely 
Strawson’s position. Robert Kane agrees with Strawson that ultimate control (‘ultimate 
responsibility’ in his terms) is necessary for moral responsibility in the deep sense of true 
desert: only if an agent is the ultimate source of her actions can it be justified to consider 
her as truly, objectively praise- or blameworthy for them. However, unlike Strawson, he 
thinks that ultimate control can be attained.2 According to Kane, an agent can choose 
rationally and voluntarily her own character and motives and so be truly responsible, in 
Strawson’s sense, for having them as well as for the choices and actions that they help to 
explain. Strawson’s challenge immediately arises: how is it possible for an agent to 
choose her own character and motives rationally and voluntarily unless she already exists 
endowed with a previous character and motives? Kane is certainly aware of this difficulty. 
He agrees that his view of ultimate responsibility ‘appears to lead to a vicious regress … 
The regress would stop with actions that were not explained by our characters and motives 
(or by anything else, for that matter), but then in what sense would be responsible for such 
actions?’ (Kane 1996: 37). 
 
In order to meet this crucial objection, Kane resorts to certain choices in a person’s life 
through which she forms her own character and motives. Kane calls these choices ‘Self-
Forming Willings’ (SFWs). If SFWs are to stop the regress that threatens ultimate 
responsibility they have to satisfy certain conditions. On the one hand, they must have no 
sufficient explanation in terms of the agent’s pre-existing character, motives and 
preferences. They have to be genuinely open and undetermined, relative to the past and 
the natural laws, for otherwise the agent could not be their ultimate source. And, on the 
other hand, it is also crucial that the choice, whichever way it may go, remains under the 
agent’s rational and volitional control. It must be a rational and motivated choice, a result 
of the agent’s rational will. Irrational or arbitrary choices are not an appropriate 
foundation of moral responsibility, as compatibilists have always contended against 
incompatibilists. 
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Can SFWs satisfy these conditions? It is tempting, but wrong, to conceive of SFWs as 
Buridan’s Ass cases, in which the agent has equal reasons for going one way or another, 
for in these cases, ‘instead of one choice … being arbitrary relative to the prior 
deliberation, both would be arbitrary’ (Kane 1996: 109). Rather, what the agent confronts 
in SFWs is incommensurable sets of reasons for going one way or another, such as moral 
reasons and reasons of self-interest, or prudential considerations and desires for an 
immediate pleasure. In cases like these, the agent is ‘torn between conflicting internal 
points of view that represent different and incommensurable visions of what they want in 
life or what they want to become’ (Kane 1996: 199). The agent’s will is unsettled. She 
wants to act on one set of reasons and she also wants to act on the other. These choices 
are self-forming in that, by making them, the agent causally contributes to shaping her 
own character, motives and will, so that she can be said to be ultimately responsible for 
those psychological factors and so for further choices and actions that can flow from them. 
Incommensurability of reasons for each option is a crucial feature of SFW situations, 
which supposedly allows the final choice, whichever it is, to be the result of the agent’s 
rational will. As Kane writes, ‘for SFWs, each outcome is rational for different and 
incommensurable reasons’ (1996: 178). 
 
Are Kane’s SFWs able to stop the regress that threatens the possibility of ultimate 
control? Though they go some way towards doing so, I do not think they go far enough. 
As we have seen, in an SFW the agent confronts a choice that she has to make on the 
basis of incommensurable reasons. But if reasons are actually incommensurable, how can 
the agent choose one of the alternatives rationally? A choice of this kind can be rationally 
made if the agent faces it with some criterion (a meta-criterion, let’s say) that allows her 
to rank one set of reasons higher than the other. Such a meta-criterion might be, for 
example, a Frankfurtian second-order volition, according to which she prefers to be 
moved to act by, say, moral reasons rather than reasons of self-interest, or maybe a 
Watsonian valuational system, which ranks the former higher than the latter (or vice 
versa). However, if the agent confronts the choice with a meta-criterion, her will is not 
unsettled and the choice cannot be truly self-forming. She can have obtained this criterion 
through prior choices she faced with incommensurable reasons; but then the rationality 
problem arises again with regard to these choices. Or she just happens to have the 
criterion, but then she lacks ultimate control over it and the resulting choice. Moreover, 
remember that, in SFWs, the final choice, whatever it is, has to be the result of the agent’s 
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rational will. But this condition will not be met if the agent confronts the choice with a 
meta-criterion, for then only some of the choices will be rational, namely those which 
accord with the criterion, but not those which conflict with it. Therefore an SFW should 
be made exclusively on the basis of the incommensurable sets of reasons the agent 
considers. And then it is hard to see how the choice could possibly be under her rational 
cum volitional control. The role of a meta-criterion is now played by the agent’s pure 
decision: ‘The agents will make one set of reasons or motives prevail over the others then 
and there by deciding … [B]oth options are wanted and the agents will settle the issue of 
which is wanted more by deciding’ (Kane 1996: 133). Kane’s libertarianism tends to turn 
into sheer voluntarism or decisionism. The agent’s choice can be ultimate at the cost of 
her losing rational control over it. In fact, the two aspects of ultimate control, namely 
ultimacy of source and rational cum volitional control, seem to pull in opposite directions. 
 
But then, if ultimate control is so seemingly impossible to attain, why insist on it as a 
necessary condition of moral responsibility? Why not to abide by relative, less radical, 
non-ultimate forms of control or self-determination? Compatibilists have in fact described 
a large variety of such forms. Won’t this insistence on ultimate control pave the way for 
scepticism? I can think of two main considerations in favour of this condition. First, the 
requirement of ultimate control corresponds to the depth of moral responsibility 
attributions. A serious ascription of moral responsibility is directed to the agent herself, 
on the assumption that she is the true, ultimate origin, and not a mere instrumental or 
derived cause, of the action or consequence thereof for which we hold her responsible. 
These attributions have deep effects on our self-esteem and sense of dignity. So the desire 
for deep personal control over the grounds on which such attributions are made is clearly 
reasonable. We do not want our worth and value to depend on factors beyond our reach 
and control. Second, compatibilist construals of the control condition, which dispense 
with ultimacy, seem capable of being satisfied by agents who prima facie do not seem 
morally responsible, such as Brave New World citizens or agents in ‘Covert Non-
Constraining Control’ situations (to use Kane’s terms). These construals would appear to 
be too weak to ground moral responsibility understood as true, objective desert. So 
understood, moral responsibility would seem to require some form of deep, ultimate 
control over our choices and actions. 
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I want to suggest that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, deep, ultimate control 
is a requirement that can actually be met, provided that some unexamined assumptions 
about this condition, which can be found in many authors, and especially in Strawson and 
Kane, are brought to light and questioned. Consider Strawson. According to him, true 
responsibility for, or ultimate control over, one’s actions requires, at the very end, that 
one has chosen one’s mental constitution, the way ‘one is, mentally speaking’ (Strawson 
1986: 28), as well as the principles on which such a choice is made. For Kane, in turn, 
ultimate responsibility rests upon Self-Forming Willings, undetermined choices by means 
of which agents build up their own character and motives. At the root of ultimate control 
over one’s actions we find acts of will or choices. So both Strawson and Kane assume as 
a matter of course a will-centred view of ultimate control and moral responsibility. For 
them, an agent cannot have deep, ultimate control over her actions and be truly praise- or 
blameworthy for them unless she has chosen the springs of those actions. This 
assumption, in turn, seems to rest upon a more general view, namely that one can be said 
to control only that which one has a choice about. Only something that is subject to one’s 
will could be said to be under one’s control and so be an appropriate ground or object for 
moral responsibility attributions. 
 
This assumption, together with a plausible rationality requirement for choices, leads 
quickly to scepticism about ultimate control. If we accept that ultimate control over one’s 
choices and actions requires that one has chosen the springs of these choices and actions 
and that this choice has itself to be based on reasons, then we shall have to accept that, in 
order for us to have ultimate control over this choice, we should have chosen the reasons 
on which we made it; but this other choice, in turn, should also be based on reasons, which 
we should have chosen in the light of further reasons, and so on. We have started the 
regress of choices of principles of choice that Strawson rightly holds to be impossible to 
complete. Scepticism looms. 
 
Another widespread and unexamined assumption in current conceptions of ultimate 
control is closely connected with the first. Consider Strawson’s claim that, in order for 
true responsibility to be possible, one has to have chosen the very roots of one’s choices, 
the principles on which one makes them. This claim, I would think, presupposes a deeply 
individualistic view of human agents as radically self-made, self-contained entities, 
whose moral responsibility is undermined by the influence of any factors that are external 
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to them and beyond the scope of their choice. This view transpires also in Kane’s 
conception of ultimate responsibility as a species of self-creation. From this 
individualistic point of view, the social nature of human agents tends to appear as a 
potential threat to their being ultimate sources or origins of their own actions and so to 
their moral responsibility for them. This second assumption reinforces the sceptical 
suspicion about moral responsibility already raised by the first one. 
 
On the background of these assumptions, my position can be stated as follows. At the 
foundational root of moral responsibility I shall not place conative phenomena, such as 
choices, but cognitive ones, such as beliefs. Especially important will be a subset of an 
agent’s beliefs, namely her evaluative views about what is really worth pursuing or 
avoiding in life. Beliefs of this sort are plausibly taken to play a central role in explaining 
our morally relevant choices and acts. I recommend, then, a cognitive, rather than a 
conative, approach to moral responsibility. I accept, however, Strawson’s and Kane’s 
contention that deep, ultimate control is a requirement for moral responsibility. Now on 
the assumption we have referred to above that all control depends on choices or acts of 
will, acceptance of ultimate control seems to conflict with the view that moral 
responsibility rests on beliefs, unless one embraces some version of doxastic voluntarism, 
a rather implausible position, in my opinion.3 However, although I share the widely held 
position that control is necessary for responsibility, I reject the no less widespread view 
that all control depends on the will. So, though belief is not voluntary, we can rightly be 
praised or blamed for our beliefs, for we can have over them a form of control that does 
not rest on acts of will or choices and is deep enough to support true praise- and 
blameworthiness attributions. As I shall try to show, it may be justified to grant someone 
deep control and authorship with regard to her factual or theoretical beliefs, as well as full 
praise- or blameworthiness for them, even if she has not chosen the reasons and principles 
on which she has formed them. In fact, in some cases we would plausibly withhold our 
praise if we discovered that she had chosen those reasons and principles. This suggests 
that something similar might apply to our evaluative beliefs. If it did, then, provided that 
these beliefs are among the basic explanatory roots of our actions, no regress of choices 
would need to start and scepticism about moral responsibility could be resisted. In 
connection with this, and with regard to the second assumption we have mentioned above, 
I shall try to show that even if someone’s intellectual achievements are indebted to some 
external sources, this need not prevent us from justifiably granting her full praise- or 
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blameworthiness for them. Again, this suggests that something similar could be the case 
with regard to an agent’s evaluative beliefs and the actions and choices flowing from 
them. Let me now defend this cognitive approach to moral responsibility. I do not have a 
conclusive argument to offer, but I can advance some considerations that show this 
position to be fairly plausible. 
 
Let us note, first, that talk about responsibility for one’s beliefs makes perfect sense and 
is rather common in everyday life. We do not find less natural to praise or blame people 
on account of their beliefs than of their choices or actions. Think for example of a racist 
person: under some circumstances, we may hold her as blameworthy for her racist views 
as for her racist behaviour. Moreover, it would be easy to find anywhere remarks like the 
following: ‘How could you believe what she told you? Don’t you know how often she 
lies?’ As happens with actions, excuses can be expected in situations of this kind: ‘Well, 
you know, this time she really looked sincere.’ We sometimes blame people for being 
careless – or, alternatively, for being too demanding – in forming their beliefs. Attribution 
of responsibility for beliefs might be interpreted within a view of control as based on 
choice. On this view, control over our beliefs would be taken to be only indirect and 
derived from the voluntary control we have over our cognitive activity. It seems true that 
we sometimes praise or blame people for their beliefs on the basis of how they have 
conducted their inquiries. However, if this were the only way in which we could be said 
to control our beliefs, the threat of a vicious regress of choices could not be conjured up. 
But I think we also acknowledge another form of control over our beliefs. This control is 
neither voluntary nor merely indirect. It does not draw entirely on the voluntary control 
we may have over our epistemic activity. If we can show that sometimes responsibility 
for beliefs rests on a form of control over them not based on choices or acts of will, this 
might be an important step in a defence of moral responsibility against scepticism, at least 
of a Strawsonian variety. Let us see what a control of this kind is like, whether it actually 
exists and whether we justifiably acknowledge it in some of our ascriptions of praise- and 
blameworthiness for beliefs. 
 
As an initial attempt to characterize the form of control we are after, let us reflect on some 
examples. Think first of a secondary school student who is trying to solve a problem of, 
say, physics. Suppose she performs the task carefully and obtains the right result. She has 
had control over both her cognitive activity and her belief about the solution to the 
 10 
problem and is praiseworthy on both accounts. It is not by mere luck that she has obtained 
the right result. But note what having control means in this case. It does not relate to 
choices or acts of will in any important sense. The student’s control consists rather in her 
yielding to the internal configuration and structure of the problem, the data, physical laws, 
mathematical rules, and so on. It is, so to speak, a passive form of control, which the 
student exercises precisely in respecting and being guided by what is there, in the problem 
itself. She chooses neither the data nor the physical laws or the mathematical rules. In 
fact, she would lose control over both the task and its result if she chose or decided about 
these things, and we would rightly blame her for doing so. Moreover, all those factors are 
external to her self or will: they come ‘from outside’. It is also true that, without the help 
of her teachers, she could not have solved the problem. And nonetheless my intuition, 
which I hope will be widely shared, is that she has control over her belief about the 
problem’s solution and truly deserves praise for this belief. So in this simple case the two 
assumptions I emphasized in Strawson’s and Kane’s construals of ultimate control as a 
requirement for true desert, namely that all control that backs true desert is based on 
choices, and that the influence of external factors undermines such a control, are simply 
absent, but true desert is still there.  
 
In order to question these assumptions further and deepen our understanding of this sort 
of non-voluntary control, consider now more complex cases of belief and belief 
formation, such as great achievements in science or philosophy. They can harmlessly be 
considered as belief systems. As a preliminary remark, these cases show that authorship 
concerning her beliefs may be no less important for a person’s worth and self-esteem than 
concerning her choices and actions. To mention only a few examples, remember the 
dispute between Newton and Leibniz about the invention of infinitesimal calculus or, in 
more recent times, the debate about the true discoverer of the virus causing AIDS. Think 
also of the strongly negative moral judgement that plagiarism deserves for most of us. 
Questions about real source or origin, and about corresponding praise- and 
blameworthiness, have no less significance in the cognitive field than in the practical one. 
Let us now come back to our main subject, namely the nature and existence of the form 
of non-voluntary control over our beliefs that we are after, by reflecting on a particular 
example of a complex and great intellectual achievement, to witness, Descartes’ 
Meditationes de prima philosophia. I hope we shall agree that Descartes must be 
considered as the true author and source of this work and that he truly and justifiably 
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deserves our praise and gratitude for it. We find him praiseworthy not only for his effort 
and activity, but also for its result, the important ideas and beliefs contained in this 
outstanding philosophical opus. However, it is interesting to note how many of the factors 
that made this work possible have not their origin in Descartes himself. It is hard to see, 
for example, how the Meditations, which are usually considered as a new starting point, 
as the very beginning of modern philosophy, could have been written without the 
influence of medieval philosophy (cf. Gilson 1951). Other important ‘external’ factors 
include Plato and the Platonic tradition, ancient and modern scepticism and contemporary 
physiology, to mention only a few. And, nonetheless, this does not incline us to question 
Descartes’ full authorship and praiseworthiness for his work. This seems to show that our 
judgements about authorship and responsibility for cognitive accomplishments do not fit 
Kane’s or Strawson’s conceptions of ultimate control, at least regarding their 
individualistic assumption. Though Descartes did not give origin to many aspects and 
elements of the Meditations, we readily consider him as the true, ultimate author and 
source of his work, and rightly so. This suggests that something similar might be the case 
in the practical field. But Descartes’ example can also be used to dispute the other 
assumption indicated above, according to which control is constitutively related to acts 
of will and choices. Though surely the will, in the form of choices, is involved in the 
process of creation of the Meditations, Descartes’ control over this work is not mainly 
based on voluntary acts or choices, but, to a large extent, in his respect for the internal 
requirements and structure of the subject matter itself, in his passively yielding to the 
relations of justification between propositions, to the internal connections between 
concepts, to the force or necessity of certain steps in the reasoning process, as well as to 
the empirical data he employs. As happened with our example of the student, if Descartes 
had made some or all of these aspects depend on his will, he would have had less control 
over his work and would have been less praiseworthy for it. So reflection on matters of 
authorship and responsibility in the realm of cognitive accomplishments does not validate 
the assumption that all control depends on the will. Our judgements in this field do not 
correspond to Strawson’s and Kane’s views of ultimate control. And, again, this suggests 
that something similar might be the case in the practical realm. 
 
Our hope can be stated as follows. If, as we have tried to show by means of examples, 
control over, and true desert for, our beliefs need not rest on choices or acts of will and is 
not necessarily undermined by the influence of external factors; and if control over our 
 12 
actions rests ultimately on control over our beliefs, then moral responsibility understood 
as true desert, as true praise- or blameworthiness, could be shown to be possible and not 
to fall prey to an infinite regress of choices or to sheer arbitrariness. My suggestion is, in 
fact, that control over, and true desert for, our actions ultimately rests on control over, and 
true desert for, our beliefs. A certain class of beliefs is especially relevant in this respect, 
namely evaluative beliefs. Evaluative beliefs are beliefs with an evaluative content. This 
evaluative content should include an agent’s conception of a human life that is worth 
living and have potential effects as a criterion for choice and a guide for action. To insist, 
a crucial advantage of grounding moral responsibility on evaluative beliefs, rather than 
choices, is that the problem of an infinite regress of choices, as well as the correlative 
problem of a groundless, arbitrary choice as a basis for moral responsibility, do not need 
to arise. Before moving on to substantiate the proposal, however, let me point out that it 
is not without precedents. A step in this direction is Gary Watson’s emphasis on values 
instead of – even second-order – desires in his view of moral responsibility (cf. Watson 
1982), as well as Susan Wolf’s ‘Reason View’ (the term is hers), according to which the 
ability to form correct values is necessary for moral responsibility (cf. Wolf 1990: 75), 
among others. 
 
Let me now proceed to a defence of my proposal. If evaluative beliefs are to ground the 
possibility of ultimate control over our choices and actions, they have to satisfy a number 
of conditions, which would seem to include at least the following: 1) Corresponding to 
the depth of moral responsibility attributions, they should be a deep, core component of 
a person’s self. 2) Under certain circumstances, the agent could be correctly considered 
as their true author and source. 3) The agent should have rational control over these 
beliefs. 4) The preceding condition should hold even if the beliefs are not causally 
determined (the proposal should not fall prey to some version or other of the so-called 
Mind argument). 
 
I would like to argue that evaluative beliefs are able to satisfy these conditions. 
Unfortunately, owing to space limits, I can only give some brief remarks in favour of this 
contention. 
 
Evaluative beliefs would certainly seem to satisfy the first condition. Our evaluative 
views are a central core of what we are, mentally speaking. No psychological 
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characterization of a person could be minimally complete unless it included a description 
of what she finds worth pursuing or avoiding in life. And if we reflect on our serious 
ascriptions of moral responsibility for choices or actions, we shall find ourselves 
ultimately praising or blaming an agent on account of the evaluative views these choices 
or actions express. In fact, if we come to see an act of hers as a momentary, passing 
impulse, not expressing her deep evaluative convictions, our judgement is significantly 
softened, or even withheld. This takes us to the second condition, which corresponds to 
the ‘ultimate source’ or true authorship aspect of ultimate control. In holding an agent 
responsible for an action on account of her evaluative views, we certainly seem to assume 
the she has proper control over them, so that she can be truly considered as her author and 
source. If we take this assumption to be false, we modify or even withhold our moral 
responsibility ascription. This happens in CNC manipulation cases, but also in more 
ordinary situations in which we do not see an agent as truly responsible for her evaluative 
beliefs. Certain victims of severely deprived childhoods or of a fanatical education can 
be examples of this predicament. But what requirements should be met in order for an 
agent to have deep control over, and to be the true author of, her evaluative views? In 
forming our initial evaluative views we are deeply influenced by our parents, close 
relatives or friends. This ‘external’, social origin is not, as such, a reason to deny our 
authorship with regard to the evaluative beliefs we end up having, as the student and 
Descartes examples show. But something else is needed. If we could do nothing but have 
the views we receive from our social environment, we would not be truly responsible for 
having them, and moral responsibility for our actions would not be possible. But we do 
not only receive beliefs, either evaluative or merely factual. We also acquire general 
standards that guide us in forming, assessing, accepting and rejecting such beliefs. This 
is an essential contribution that sociality makes to our constitution as agents. The most 
basic of these standards has to do with the truth-aiming character of belief. It demands of 
us that we allow our beliefs to be determined and controlled by the way things actually 
are. Another important standard for accepting and rejecting beliefs has to do with their 
logical relations. Contradictions, for example, are important reasons to modify our beliefs 
in order to avoid them. Applying these and other standards an agent can arrive to a system 
of beliefs which can truly be said to be her own and which she can be truly responsible 
for. And this holds for her evaluative beliefs as well. She may discover by her own, often 
painful, experience that an evaluative view she was taught is not actually true. And she 
may notice contradictions in her received evaluative views and be led to reshape them. 
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However, as our previous examples indicate, it is not needed, for these beliefs to be truly 
attributable to an agent, that she has chosen the standards and procedures she employs in 
forming, retaining or abandoning them. In a modest way, as compared with such great 
intellectual accomplishments as Descartes’ Meditations, but not in a completely different 
sense, a system of evaluative beliefs can be truly ascribed to an agent as its source and 
author, and so as something for which she can truly deserve praise or blame. Moreover, 
though I shall not develop this important point here, I hold that having available 
alternatives to her actual evaluative beliefs is also a necessary condition on an agent’s 
true authorship and responsibility for them. An alternative possibilities condition is 
applicable to an agent’s evaluative beliefs no less than to her actions and choices if she is 
to have ultimate control over them. 
 
The third condition corresponds to the other aspect of ultimate control, namely rational 
control. Irrational or arbitrary evaluative beliefs would not be fit to ground moral 
responsibility. Now, we control our actions rationally and voluntarily by choosing them 
in the light of our evaluative beliefs, but the control we should have over these beliefs in 
order for us to have ultimate control over our actions does not rest on a further choice of 
these beliefs. It is rather a matter of sensitivity to their internal consistency and respect 
for the facts they aim to capture, namely facts about what is valuable and worthwhile in 
human life. This control does not relate to our ability to choose and act, but rather to our 
ability to see what is there to be seen. This sort of non-voluntary, theoretical control, as 
it might be called, is an appropriate basis for praise and blame. It may relate to some cases 
in which we are blamed (or praised) for something we involuntarily did or omitted, such 
as forgetting (or remembering) our partner’s birthday or an appointment we had for 
dinner. Even if believing, like forgetting, is not voluntary, and not even an action, we can 
justifiably blame someone for her beliefs, in the same way as our partner can justifiably 
blame us for forgetting our appointment. This blaming seems to assume some form of 
non-voluntary control. In blaming us for forgetting our appointment, our partner is 
blaming us for not seeing rather than not acting: for our blindness to both our appointment 
and her, which reveals our lack of consideration and respect for both. And she is assuming 
that we ought, and could, have remembered the appointment. Something closely 
analogous, I would think, holds when we blame someone for the evaluative views that an 
act of hers reveals. 
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In commenting on the last two conditions we have crucially insisted, in analogy with the 
case of our theoretical beliefs, on a sort of control based, not on choices or acts of will, 
but rather on an attitude of humility and respect to what is there, to something endowed 
with a kind of objectivity. Defending this sort of control seems to commit us to some 
version of objectivism, to the idea that there are facts of the matter that our beliefs should 
be guided by and respond to. In the case of evaluative beliefs, we are committed to some 
version of objectivism about the evaluative. An unrestricted, rampant objectivism in this 
field might appear as a rather implausible position. I do not think, however, that the 
version of objectivism we are committed to by virtue of our proposal should go that far. 
We do not need to assert that there are such entities as values. It seems enough to accept 
that there are facts of the matter in virtue of which evaluative beliefs can be true or false; 
that someone can be genuinely wrong in her evaluative views; and that evaluative truths 
are discovered, not invented.4 However, it is important to note that someone can have the 
sort of control over her evaluative beliefs that is required for true authorship and desert 
even if these beliefs are not actually true. Essential to the possession of this sort of control 
is rather the attitude of respect to what is objectively there, as well as the aim of having 
one’s beliefs guided and determined by it. This holds also for theoretical beliefs. To come 
back to a previous example, consider that many theses contained in Descartes’ 
Meditations might actually be false, but, even if they were, Descartes would still be rightly 
considered as the true author of this great intellectual legacy and as truly praiseworthy for 
it. 
 
A second issue raised by my proposal has to do with motivation.5 If evaluative beliefs are 
to make an agent’s ultimate control over her actions possible, they have to be able to 
motivate her to perform those actions. A complete causal-explanatory isolation between 
evaluative beliefs and actions would deprive an agent from control over the latter by 
means of the former. Motivation, like objectivity, is a big issue, which I cannot deal with 
in depth here and much less provide something resembling a solution to it. I will restrict 
myself to a couple of remarks. First, there is something quite bizarre in holding an 
evaluative belief with no motivating consequence at all, even potential. If, for example, 
someone seriously holds that causing unnecessary pain to an innocent person is morally 
wrong but does not feel motivated at all to act (and react) according to this (true) belief, 
there is reason to resort to psychopathology in order to account for this mismatch. She 
may feel motivated to act against such a belief (owing maybe to a sadistic tendency) and 
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actually do so, but if she really has the belief, only psychopathology could be of help if 
its contrary motivating potential did not manifest itself at least as shame or remorse. 
Second, evaluative facts need the participation of emotions in order to be properly 
appreciated. So, someone unable to feel or react emotionally in seeing someone else 
causing unnecessary pain to an innocent person is likely to be unable to see the wrongness 
in this situation and to form the corresponding general evaluative belief. Appreciation of 
evaluative facts and forming evaluative beliefs is a ‘thick’, emotionally laden cognitive 
performance. But the motivating potential of emotions is generally acknowledged. 
 
Before moving on to the next condition, let me address another objection that might be 
raised against my proposal. I have insisted on a form of control over our beliefs based on 
respect and deference towards objective facts and principles. On this view, control would 
not consist in choosing these factors, but rather in being guided by them. It might be 
objected, then, that this view leads rather to heteronomy, to the subject’s being ‘remotely 
controlled’, ruled by external forces.6 I would like to respond as follows. First, it is 
important to point out that the case for my proposal rests in a large degree on the intuitions 
raised by the examples we considered. Now, are we really prepared to hold that, in 
following correct reasoning principles, mathematical rules, in accepting certain data and 
laws of physics as given in order to find out the result of the problem she was trying to 
solve, our student acted in a heteronomous way or that she was ‘remotely controlled’ by 
those objective, ‘external’ factors? My response, which I hope will be widely shared, 
would be ‘no’. And a similar question could be raised and a similar answer given for what 
regards the example of Descartes. Second, I tend to think that the objection takes for 
granted the will-centred and individualistic conception of control that I have tried to 
dispute and so begs the question against my proposal. Someone who finds this objection 
powerful is probably in the grip of the individualistic and voluntaristic assumptions that 
I have been at pains to undermine, according to which an autonomous and morally 
responsible agent has to be a radically self-made entity, so that the influence of any factors 
beyond the scope of her choice is potentially threatening to her authorship and true desert 
for her deeds and accomplishments. Many factors coming ‘from outside’ are not in the 
way of our nature as morally responsible agents, but are rather constitutive of it. Again, 
if someone disagrees, I would ask him to reflect on the examples we presented and other 
similar cases and to judge whether many ‘objective’ factors present in the student’s task 
of solving the problem or in Descartes’ writing of the Meditations detract from their 
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respective praiseworthiness for those achievements or are rather constitutive conditions 
thereof. I would certainly say the latter, and I think there are powerful considerations in 
favour of this judgement. However, as I already pointed out, I do not have, at present, any 
conclusive arguments to offer to someone who rejects the judgement. 
 
Let me finally address the fourth condition I mentioned. A traditional compatibilist 
objection to libertarianism is that indeterminism erodes an agent’s rational and volitional 
control over her choices and actions, which turn into arbitrary, hazardous events, thus 
undermining her moral responsibility for them. This objection, which is usually known 
as the Mind argument, has been formulated in several ways. Consider Josephine, a judge 
who, after careful and relevant deliberation, decides at a certain time, T, not to grant 
clemency to a convict and to sentence him to life prison.7 Let me now apply to this 
example Alfred Mele’s recent version of the objection. Imagine a close possible world, 
with the same past and natural laws as the one Josephine inhabits, in which an identical 
twin of hers, call her Josephine*, exists. The first difference between the two worlds 
occurs only at time T. At this moment, while Josephine decides to sentence the convict 
to life prison, Josephine* decides instead to grant him clemency. On the assumption that 
Josephine’s decision is causally undetermined, this is clearly conceivable. But then, in 
Mele’s words, ‘if … there is nothing about the agents’ powers, capacities, states of mind, 
moral character, and the like that explains this difference in outcome, then the difference 
really is just a matter of luck’ (Mele 1999: 99). From this perspective, Josephine’s 
decision would appear to be a chancy and arbitrary event, not under her rational and 
volitional control. 
 
This objection may be powerful against will-centred views of ultimate control, but the 
cognitive approach I recommend might succeed against it. On this approach, it is practical 
judgement, rather than choice, that plays the pivotal role in practical deliberation. A 
practical judgement about which action is best, or better than the alternatives, should be 
understood as the application of an agent’s evaluative beliefs, as normative standards, to 
the situation she faces. Now, even if choices are not causally determined by practical 
judgements, it is not a mere accident that an agent’s choice usually accords with her 
practical judgement. Practical judgement is a normative standard for choice and this is 
why discrepancy between the two usually counts as irrational and abnormal, as a case of 
incontinence or weakness of the will. Now with these remarks in mind we are not forced 
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to conclude that Josephine’s decision was a matter of luck just because it differed from 
Josephine*’s. Since the only difference between the two worlds arises only at T, the 
decision’s time, we can assume that Josephine and Josephine*, after a similar careful and 
relevant deliberation, formed the same practical judgement, namely that sentencing the 
convict to life prison was better than the alternatives. If, thereafter, Josephine decided in 
accord with this judgement while Josephine* decided against it, this only shows that 
Josephine*’s decision was irrational or weak-willed, but not that Josephine’s decision 
was so as well. Josephine, unlike Josephine*, had rational control over her decision, 
which so was not arbitrary or merely lucky. The example may show that Josephine, like 
any of us, is not immune to irrationality or weakness of the will, but this is much less than 
is needed to show that indeterminism is incompatible with rational and volitional control 
over our choices and actions. What needs to be shown is that indeterminism turns virtually 
all of our choices and actions into lucky, arbitrary events. And the example does not yield 
this result. 
 
I conclude, then, that a cognitive approach to moral responsibility, within the lines we 
have drawn, may be in a better position than a conative, will-centred approach in order to 
overcome some traditional difficulties of libertarianism, especially those related to 
ultimate control as a requirement for moral responsibility. 
 
NOTES 
* This paper is inspired in Moya (2006). Chapter 5 of this book is especially relevant for the ideas I present 
here. I thank Dr Lumer and Dr Nannini for their kind invitation to take part in the conference “Intentionality, 
Deliberation and Autonomy. The Action Theoretic Foundation of Practical Philosophy”, in which I 
presented the original version of this paper. I thank Michael Bratman, Alfred Mele and the participants in 
the conference for their comments, suggestions and criticisms. Very special thanks are due to Christoph 
Lumer for reading carefully the original version of this paper and suggesting many ways in which it could 
be improved. 
 
1 Though the point would need more argument, it may suffice to note that control, so understood, would be 
possessed by higher animals and very young children. 
 
2 For purposes of exposition, I shall present Kane’s work as if it were an attempt to respond to Strawson’s 
argument. Of course it is much more than that. 
 
3 Bernard Williams (1973) famously argued that beliefs are not under our direct voluntary control, so that 
there is no much room for deciding to believe. I find Williams’s rejection of doxastic voluntarism very 
convincing. 
 
4 Objectivism about evaluative beliefs or judgements is far from being a hopeless position. I would tend to 
think that it is rather subjectivism, in its different forms, that is really in trouble. A recent and solid defence 
of objetivism (and cognitivism) in ethics can be found in Wiggins (2005). 
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5 Christoph Lumer encouraged me to discuss this and the previous issue concerning objectivism. 
 
6 It was also Christoph Lumer who raised this objection. The terms ‘heteronomy’ and ‘remotely  controlled’ 
are his. 
 
7 The example is vaguely inspired in an example of Van Inwagen’s (1983: 68–9). 
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